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Preemption and the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law
I. INTRODUCTION
"This [North Carolina law] is the toughest law against
predatory lending in the country. I am confident this will be a
model law for all state legislatures."'  When former North
Carolina Attorney General Mike Easley made this statement, it
embodied his belief that the North Carolina Predatory Lending
Law,2 passed on July 22, 1999, would not only protect North
Carolina home buyers, but also lead the nation in fighting
predatory lending. It appears, however, that the North Carolina
predatory lending law may be vulnerable to a claim of preemption
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") with
respect to national banks.3  Despite questions about the
constitutionality of preemption in state consumer protection laws,4
history shows that the OCC has a predetermined course of action
- preemption of state law. On Thursday, September 30, 2003, the
OCC preempted the Georgia Fair Lending Act ("GFLA") in its
first action against state predatory lending laws.'
As the continued applicability of state predatory lending
laws to national banks becomes less certain,6 North Carolina
regulators, national and state banks, and consumers must consider
the possible ramifications of the OCC's actions. Part II of this
note describes the history of predatory lending and the steps both
1. THE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUMMARY OF NC PREDATORY
LENDING LAW, (2002), available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/
shortsumm.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2002).
3. See Chris Lipsett et. al., Preemption: What's New and What's Ahead, 2003
PRACTICING LAW INST., Mar.-May 2003, at 545, 552.
4. Paul Foley (FEB. 7, 2004) (Unpublished manuscript on file with NCBI). This
note provides an analysis of the merits of preemption.
5. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003).
6. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68
Fed. Reg. 150, 46,119 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
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North Carolina and Georgia have taken to combat it.' Part III will
then analyze the OCC's order preempting Georgia's predatory
lending law in order to determine the standard that the OCC will
apply in future preemption issues and to identify recent trends in
the actions of the OCC toward preemption.8 Part IV will attempt
to predict the likelihood and effects of preemption in North
Carolina.9 Finally, in Part V, this note will analyze the advantages
and disadvantages of the OCC's policy toward predatory lending
as compared to the North Carolina predatory lending law. i°
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Predatory Lending
Predatory lending is the use of unfair practices by lenders
in order to take advantage of borrowers."' In recent years, the
number of loans that contain questionable practices that are
generally associated with predatory lending has soared. 2 These
practices include (1) excessive prepayment penalties, (2) scheduled
balloon payments, (3) negative amortization, and (4) repeated
refinancing of loans. 3  The poor, elderly, and financially
unsophisticated are most vulnerable to predatory lending practices
because of their need to obtain credit and their inability to
understand the predatory terms. 14
Since the vast majority of these people are subprime
borrowers, predatory lending is most prevalent in the subprime
market. 5 Subprime lenders provide credit to high-risk borrowers
7. See infra notes 11-75 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 76-137 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 138-159 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 160-194 and accompanying text.
11. Richard R. Daugherty, Note, Will North Carolina's Predatory Home Lending
Act Protect Borrowers from the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal
Law?, 4 N.C. BANKING INST., 569, 570 (2000).
12. See 1999 Home Equity Lending Directory: A Statistical Guide to B&C and
Second Mortgage Lending, Faulkner and Gray 1-2 (1999).
13. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 575-76.
14. Id. at 569.
15. See Amal Sabi, Tiff Surrounds Big Bank's Subprime Efforts, TRIANGLE Bus.
J., May 28, 1999, at 9.
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who are unable to obtain credit in the conventional market in
exchange for a greater interest rate. 6 Generally, the high-risk
borrowers who must resort to subprime credit are the same poor,
elderly, and financially unsophisticated borrowers that are
vulnerable to predatory lending. 7 As a result, the subprime
market provides loans to the people who are most vulnerable to
predatory lending. 8
As subprime borrowing became a larger share of the credit
market, 9 the concerns about predatory lending increased.2" In
response, both federal and state governments felt compelled to
take action. 2' The question for lawmakers was whether to restrict
the practices of predatory lending or restrict the availability of
subprime credit.
B. The North Carolina Predatory Lending Law
On July 22, 1999, the North Carolina State Legislature
passed the nation's first state predatory lending law.22 Consumer
advocacy groups effectively lobbied for strict ceilings on both
interest rates and fees.2 ' The law passed by an overwhelming
forty-seven to two vote in the Senate and one hundred and nine to
nine vote in the House. 24 Roy Cooper, who was North Carolina
Senate Majority Leader at the time, praised the legislation as "the
toughest law against predatory lending in the country.', 25
The North Carolina predatory lending law prohibits
specific practices on all loans, creates a new category of "high-
cost" home loans, and places greater restrictions on these so-called
16. See Scott Leath & Jim Weiker, High-Risk Lender, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Dec. 20, 1998, at F1, available at 1998 WL 24032312.
17. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 569.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 575.
20. See Lew Sichelman, Battle Now Moves to States, ORIGINATION NEWS, Aug. 1,
1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 11126452.
21. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 570.
22. See Poonkulali Thangavelu, North Carolina Has First Law to Police Predatory
Lending, ORIGINATION NEWS, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 11126452.
23. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 592-93.
24. THE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1.
25. Id.
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"high-cost" loans.2 6 A loan is characterized as a "high-cost" home
loan if the interest rates, points and fees, or prepayment penalties
exceed the thresholds set by the statute.27
Current North Carolina law prohibits certain practices
characteristic of predatory lending in all home loans. 28 The first
protection outlaws the "flipping" of a loan.29 "Flipping" is the
practice of repeatedly refinancing an existing home loan and
always charging upfront fees.3" Second, lenders can only finance
insurance premiums calculated on a monthly basis, not single,
upfront payment premiums.31 Finally, lenders are not allowed to
encourage default in order to refinance debt.32 A violation of any
of these prohibitions subjects an offender to both usury and unfair
trade practice remedies.33
The North Carolina predatory lending law also places even
more extensive restrictions on loans that meet the requirements of
a "high-cost" home loan.34 A loan is characterized as "high-cost"
if its terms exceed one of the following statutory thresholds:35 the
annual percentage rate must be lower than ten percent above the
comparable Treasury bond rate;36 the points and fees cannot
exceed five percent of the loan amount;37 and the prepayment
penalty cannot exceed two percent of the amount prepaid. 8 If a
loan exceeds one of these thresholds, the loan is then considered
"high-cost" and is subject to more statutory regulation.39
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (2001). A loan is considered a "high-cost"
home loan if the principal does not exceed either the loan size limit for a single-
family as determined by Fannie Mae or $300,000, the borrower is a natural person,
the mortgaged property is used for personal, family, or household purposes, and the
loan exceeds one of the thresholds in the statute. Id.
27. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 594.
28. See id. at 597.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (2002).
30. THE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(b) (2002).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(d) (2002).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(e) (2002).
34. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 595.
35. Id., at 593-94.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(a) (2002).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b) (2002).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(c) (2002).
39. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 594.
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A lender may not make a "high-cost" home loan until the
borrower has received home-ownership counseling.4 °
Additionally, a lender cannot approve a "high-cost home loan"
unless the borrower appears to have the ability to repay the loan
without considering the value of the collateral.4 Assuming these
two criteria are met, a high-cost home loan is legal as long as it
does not violate the additional statutory prohibitions.42 The first
additional restriction mandates that provisions which allow the
lender to accelerate the indebtedness at its sole discretion are
unlawful.43 Next, the statute prohibits balloon payments that
require the borrower to pay a large lump sum at the end of the
loan term.' Third, negative amortization, a situation where
payments are so low that a higher loan principal results after the
payment,45 is prohibited.46 Fourth, a "high-cost" home loan cannot
contain a clause that raises the interest rate upon default.47 Fifth,
the loan must not include an advance payment of more than two
periodic payments as a condition of receiving the loan.48 Finally, a
lender may not charge fees for modifying the terms of a loan or
deferring payments.49  Banks engaging in these prohibited
practices may also be subject to usury and unfair and deceptive
acts and practices liability.5"
Stella Adams of the North Carolina Fair Housing Center
believes that the North Carolina predatory lending law "provides
North Carolinians with a great safety net against predatory
lending."'" Certainly, this law strictly prohibits the practices
utilized by predatory lenders that are permitted under federal
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c)(1) (2002). A counselor approved by the North
Carolina Housing Finance Agency must certify to the lender that the he or she has
counseled the borrower on the advisability of the loan transaction. Id.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c)(2) (2002).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2002).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(1) (2002).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(2) (2002).
45. Daugherty, supra note 11, at 575-76.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(3) (2002).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(4) (2002).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(5) (2002).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(6) (2002).
50. See Daugherty, supra note 11, at 597.
51. THE COALITION OF RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1.
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law.52 If one believes that the federal law is inadequate, then the
North Carolina predatory lending law provides essential
protection for consumers.53 As former North Carolina Attorney
General Mike Easley predicted, the North Carolina predatory
lending law has been "a model law for all state legislatures."54
C. The Georgia Fair Lending Act
The North Carolina predatory lending law served as the
model for the Georgia State Legislature in its deliberations to
develop predatory lending legislation.55  On April 22, 2002,
Governor Roy Barnes of Georgia signed into law the Georgia Fair
Lending Act56 ("GFLA").57 The Act became the most stringent
predatory lending law in the nation.58
The GFLA prohibits lenders from financing single, upfront
insurance premiums,' 9 flipping,6" and encouraging default on
existing loans.61 These provisions are taken directly from the
North Carolina predatory lending law.62 In addition, the GFLA
also prohibits late fees for payments made less than ten days past
the payment due date,63 late fees that are greater than five percent
of the default,' and fees for inquiring about the payoff balance.65
52. See Daugherty, supra note 11, at 598-99.
53. See id.
54. THE COALITION OF RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 1.
55. Matthew Eisley & Chris Serres, Laws on Lenders may Fall to Feds, THE
NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 5, 2003, at 1A.
56. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003).
57. Leetra Harris & Brian Nichols, Credit or Loan Discrimination; Define and
Prohibit Abusive Home Loan Practices; Provide for Prohibited Practices and
Limitations for Covered Home Loans and High-Cost Home Loans Create Consumer
Protections for Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans; Provide for
Penalties and Enforcement; Provide Exceptions for Unintended Violations; Provide
for Severability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 14, 18 (2002).
58. Robert M. Jaworski, Legislating Against Bad Loans; The State/Local
Battleground, 58 Bus. LAw. 1229, 1231 (May 2003).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(1) (2003).
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-4 (2003).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(2) (2003).
62. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. The GFLA has the exact same
provisions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3 to -4.
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(3) (2003).
64. Id.
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(4) (2003).
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The GFLA also follows the North Carolina Law in
imposing greater restrictions on loans that are classified as "high-
cost" home loans.6 6  If a home loan meets the "high-cost"
thresholds, then the borrower must receive home-ownership
counseling67 and the lender must consider the borrower's ability to
pay without resorting to foreclosure. 68 The GFLA also prohibits
call provisions, balloon payments, negative amortization, higher
default interest rates, advance payments, and modification fees on
"high-cost" home loans. 69 In addition to these prohibitions, which
are also found under North Carolina law,7" the GFLA goes further
by prohibiting foreclosure without written notice, clauses that
provide for mandatory arbitration in a forum that is inconvenient
to the borrower, and payment for home improvements by the
lender out of the loan proceeds.7
Georgia state Senator Cheeks, a supporter of the GFLA,
stated, "if you are trying to gouge people, watch out... [i]f you are
violating an American Dream, older persons keeping their homes
through their golden years, this bill will stop you."72 Consumer
activist groups, such as the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN"), praised the Georgia
legislature for "protecting their homeowners because the federal
government wasn't doing so." 73  The Georgia legislature had
responded to a mounting number of complaints of predatory
lending.74 In response to the toughness of Georgia's predatory
lending law, however, the GFLA became the first predatory
lending law to come under the scrutiny of the OCC.75
66. Jaworski, supra note 58 at 1230.
67. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(7) (2003).
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(8) (2003).
69. Jaworski, supra note 58 at 1230.
70. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. Harris & Nichols, supra note 57, at 14.
73. Todd Davenport & Douglas Cantor, Hawke: Get Set for Preemption of Ga.
Loan Law, AM. BANKER, July 25, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL 3347784 (quoting
ACORN spokesman David Swanson).
74. Harris & Nichols, supra note 57, at 15.
75. See Rob Blackwell & Davenport, A Heavy Load this Fall for Regulators, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 25, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL 61297528.
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III. THE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
A. The Preemption of the Georgia Fair Lending Act
On Thursday, September 30, 2003, the OCC preempted the
GFLA.76 National City Corporation of Indiana requested that the
OCC determine whether its operations in Georgia were subject to
the GFLA.77 The prohibitions in the GFLA resulted in different
lending thresholds between Georgia law and the federal law that
National City was subject to as a national bank. 8  Mr. Konyk,
National City Corporation's Vice President for Regulatory
Management, said that national banks wanted preemption because
"[a]s long as there are differing standards, it causes [National City]
operational difficulties."79
The Order issued by the OCC significantly reduced the
reach of the GFLA.8 ° It preempted all provisions of the GFLA
and exempted all national banks and their subsidiaries in Georgia
from the GFLA's restrictions and limitations.8 Because the
GFLA contains a preemption parity wildcard provision 82 that
allows state-chartered banks the same advantages received by
national banks through preemption,83 the GFLA now applies only
to nonbank lenders.84
Georgia lawmakers reacted critically to the move they saw
as a power grab by the federal regulators at the expense of laws
76. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 150, 46,264 (Aug. 5.
2003).
77. Douglas Cantor, OCC Preempts in Ga., AM. BANKER, Aug. 1, 2003, at 2,
available at 2003 WL 3347935.
78. Todd Davenport, Why OCC may Tread Lightly on Georgia Law, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 9, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL 3345133.
79. Id.
80. Robert Luke, National Rules Eclipse Georgia's Predatory Lending Law,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 1, 2003, at G1.
81. Memorandum from Don Lampe, Gene Katz, & Steve Dunlevie, Attorneys,
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLC, to Clients and Interested Persons (Aug. 4,
2003) (on file with N.C. Banking Institute).
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-12 (2003). The preemption parity provision is a
wildcard statute that provides state banks with at least the same powers as their
national bank counterparts. See id.
83. Memorandum from Don Lampe, et. al., supra note 81.
84. Luke, supra note 80, at G1.
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meant to protect consumers." David Sorrell, Georgia's Banking
Commissioner, stated, "[i]t certainly is a very broad reach for the
federal national-bank regulator.... We've got to be careful to
make sure that state laws protecting the consumer are not pre-
empted by federal regulatory fiat.... "86 Georgia Governor Sonny
Perdue's spokesman said that the OCC had "overstepped its
bounds., 87 John Hawke, Comptroiler of the Currency, responded
that the powers of national banks to determine interest rates and
fees "cannot be obstructed by state laws or regulations., 88
At the same time it preempted the GFLA, the OCC
proposed a national anti-predatory lending requirement that
would require banks to make loans based on the borrower's ability
to pay rather than the value of collateral.89 The benefit of the
national anti-predatory lending rule according to OCC Chief
Counsel Julie Williams is it establishes a "uniform, nationally
applicable predatory-lending standard for all types of loans,
anywhere in the country."9 The Preemption Determination and
Order against the GFLA, however, failed to consider field
preemption in predatory lending.9" Had the Preemption
Determination and Order considered field preemption, it would
have preempted all state predatory lending laws on the theory that
Congress has adopted a complete legislative scheme addressing
the issue.92 It appears that the OCC's "uniform, nationally-
applicable predatory-lending standard" rationale would have
supported complete preemption of all state efforts to regulate
predatory lending as applicable to national banks.93 The OCC
concluded, however, on January 7, 2004 that federal law does not
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cantor, supra note 77, at 1.
88. Luke, supra note 80, at G1.
89. See generally Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and
Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 &
34).
90. Cantor, supra note 77, at 1.
91. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,265.
92. See generally McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
93. Cantor, supra note 77, at 1 (quoting Julie Williams, OCC Chief Counsel).
2004]
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occupy the field of real estate lending.94 It does, however, preempt
most state predatory lending regulations.95 A field preemption
regulation would have followed the lead of the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), which has already determined that Congress
has given them the authority to occupy the field in order to
enhance the safety and soundness of federal savings associations.96
B. The Preemption Standard
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that "the
Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .... ,"
97
In McCullough v. Maryland,98 the Supreme Court recognized that
under this clause states "have no power, by taxation or otherwise
to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the
operations" of the federal government.99 Congress can preempt a
state law with a supreme federal law in one of three ways.'00 First,
Congress may use language that sets forth the scope of preemption
in the legislation.1"' Second, Congress may adopt a scheme of
legislation that effectively "occupies the field" by leaving no room
for state regulation.'0 2 Finally, Congress may adopt a statute that
is in irreconcilable conflict with a state law.'0 3 The Supreme Court
in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson" held that a state
law is in irreconcilable conflict with the National Bank Act if it
94. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904 (proposed Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
95. See id.
96. See Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision
4 (Jan. 21, 2003) www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56301.pdf. The Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") has also made similar preemption determinations in regard to national
thrifts. The OTS, however, may have greater statutory preemptive power than the
OCC. See HOLA 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000). This decision is outside the scope of this
note.
97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.






104. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of one of the federal
statute's purposes.10
5
The questions of whether Congress occupies the field or
whether laws are in irreconcilable conflict are determined by
congressional intent."6 The inquiry is whether Congress, "in
enacting the federal Statute, intend[ed] to exercise its
constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws of a
State."' 7 The OCC contends that the exercise by a national bank
of a federal power is not subject to state law, with limited
exceptions.0 8 Upon passage of the National Banking Act, Senator
Sumner remarked, "[c]learly, the [national] bank must not be
subjected to any local government, state or municipal; it must be
kept absolutely and exclusively under the Government from which
it derives its functions. ' 9 In its analysis, the Supreme Court has
been "unable to perceive that Congress intended to leave the field
open for the states to attempt to promote the welfare and stability
of national banks by direct legislation.""0  Under these
interpretations, the OCC argues that it should possess sole
authority to examine, supervise, and regulate national banks."'
Therefore, the OCC contends that any restrictions placed on
national banks by state legislation are invalid. The OCC
recognizes, however, that state laws may apply if the provisions do
not alter the powers granted to national banks by federal law." 2
The OCC further concedes that state law may be applicable in
contracts, debt collection, property transfers, zoning, and tort
law.' Noticeably absent from this list, however, is consumer
protection from predatory lending."' On the other hand, in
Association of Banks in Insurance, Inc. v. Duryee,"5 the southern
105. Id. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id.
108. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,273-74.
109. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1" Sess. 1893 (1864).
110. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1903).
111. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,264.
112. Id.
113. Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir.
2002).
114. Lipsett, supra note 3, at 547.
115. Ass'n of Banks in Ins., Inc. v. Duryee, 55 F. Supp. 2d 799 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
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district court for Ohio held that "[w]here state and federal laws are
inconsistent, the state law is pre-empted even if it was enacted by
the state to protect its citizens or consumers."' 6 As summarized
by Comptroller Hawke, "in preemption situations, the only
relevant issue is whether the state law would impair or interfere
with the national bank's exercise of powers granted to it under
federal law.... If such an impact is found to exist, federal law must
prevail. ...17
On the other hand, state law supporters argue for state
regulation of consumer protection against both state and national
banks." 8 At the time of the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act,'19 Congress found that
"[s]tates have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of their
consumers."'2 °  In order to protect these rights, "states have a
strong interest in the activities and operations of depository
institutions doing business within their jurisdictions, regardless of
the type of charter an institution holds.' 2' According to the
Riegle-Neal Act, interstate branches of national banks must
comply with the laws of the host state in the areas of community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and interstate
banking. 2 2 Therefore, under the state regulators' interpretation,
national banks should be subject to Acts like the GFLA.123 But,
the Riegle-Neal Act also contains a provision that limits the
application of state laws in these areas to the extent that the laws
have not been preempted. 24
In the National Bank Act of 1864, Congress established the
116. Id. at 802.
117. Davenport & Cantor, supra note 73, at 4.
118. Letter from Neil Milner, President of the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, to the Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency
(2003) www.csbs.org/government/regulatory/comment-ltrs/cl_06.23.03.pdf
119. Reigle-Neal Insterstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 102-408, 108 Stat. 2, 338 (1994) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)
(2000)). This act gave national and state banks the powers of interstate banking.
120. H.R. REP. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.N. 2039.
121. Id.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A). See also Letter from Neil Milner, supra note 118.
123. Id.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 371(f)(1)(A) (2003). Preemption Determination and Order, 68
Fed. Reg. at 46275.
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powers of national banks to make real estate loans. 25  The
National Bank Act provided that "[a]ny national banking
association may make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or
extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in real estate,
subject to ... such restrictions and requirements as the
Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or
order."12 6 The most-favored lender doctrine allows national banks
to charge the highest interest rate allowed in the state in which the
bank is located rather than where it is operating.127 The GFLA
applied to all banks operating in Georgia, regardless of where they
were headquartered. 28  The OCC contends that the GFLA
attempted to prohibit banks located in states without a predatory
lending law from exporting that rate to Georgia. 129 Therefore, the
GFLA can not apply to national banks. 3 '
C. The Recent Preemption Trends
The preemption of the GFLA is the most recent evidence
of the escalating dispute between state regulators and the OCC as
to who has the power to regulate banking products.' As states
have become more interested in regulating national banks
conducting business within their borders, the OCC has become
more interested in protecting its banks from having to comply with
different laws in every state.'32  Indeed, John Hawke, the
Comptroller of the Currency, has made strengthening the
preemption power of the national banking system his top
priority.'33
125. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2003).
126. Id.
127. See Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,
439 U.S. 299 (1978).
128. GA CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-3 (2003). The GFLA applies to "all home loans"
regardless of whether the lender is a national or state bank.
129. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46265.
130. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46265.
131. Lipsett, supra note 3, at 543.
132. Id.
133. Rob Blackwell & Todd Davenport, A Heavy Load this Fall for Regulators,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 25, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 61297528.
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As the first state to enact a home loan predatory lending
statute,'34 North Carolina stands in a precarious situation in
regards to the continued applicability to national banks of its
predatory lending statute. 35 This is especially true as the GFLA
was based on the North Carolina Act. 136 Yet the current North
Carolina Attorney General, Roy Cooper, continues to assert
North Carolina's right to police lending practices within the state
to ensure fair access to credit.137
IV. THE LIKELIHOOD OF PREEMPTION IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. The Similarities of the GFLA and the North Carolina
Predatory Lending Law
The North Carolina predatory lending law served as the
model for the GFLA.138  However, the Georgia law is not
identical. 139 Instead, it is more restrictive. 4 ' The GFLA included
every restriction and limitation contained in the North Carolina
law plus additional limitations.' The OCC expressly preempted
every restrictive provision in the GFLA.'42 Due to this blanket
preemption, one may assume a similar result if a national bank
asked the OCC to preempt the North Carolina law.
Yet it should be noted that in drafting the North Carolina
predatory lending law, legislators strived to make the law
134. Eisley & Serres, supra note 55.
135. See Letter from Joseph A. Smith, North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, to
the Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency 4 (Oct. 2, 2003) (on
file with NCBI).
136. See Eisley & Serres, supra note 55.
137. Id.
138. Cf id.
139. Telephone Interview with Phillip Lehman, Assistant North Carolina
Attorney General (Oct. 23, 2003). The GFLA prohibited charging a fee for
transmitting the balance due to pay off a home loan. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(3)
(2003). The North Carolina predatory lending law, however, places no such
restriction on fees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (2002).
140. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (2003), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E
(2002), with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003).
141. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (2002), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E
(2002), with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -11 (2003).
142. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,264.
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"preemption-proof."' 143  Rather than place caps on interest rates
and fees, the North Carolina law purposely placed thresholds on
interest rates and fees that would subject loans to additional
protections such as home ownership counseling instead of actual
prohibitions on excessive interest rates.' 44  North Carolina
legislators believed that if the law failed to regulate the interest
rates of a loan, it could not be preempted. 45  The OCC now
believes, however, that any impediment to a national bank's
exercise of a power should result in preemption-a stance that
endangers North Carolina's efforts to fight predatory lending. 146
B. The Possibility of Field Preemption in Consumer Protection
The OCC has solicited comments on whether to preempt
the field of national banks' real estate lending activities. 47  It
believes that only the Comptroller of the Currency, and not a
state, possesses the power to regulate real estate lending, including
predatory lending, by national banks.' In the light of the OCC's
current view on preemption power, state regulators, banking
professionals, and consumer activists expected field preemption of
real estate lending activities, which would effectively invalidate the
North Carolina predatory lending laws.'49 While the OCC chose
not to take this action, the extensive regulation issued by the OCC
on January 7, 2004, still endangers the viability of the North
Carolina predatory lending law. 50
143. Telephone Interview with Phillip Lehman, Assistant North Carolina
Attorney General (Oct. 23, 2003).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Davenport & Cantor, supra note 73.
147. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,119 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34).
148. Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes Steps to Keep
Abusive Practices Out of National Banking System While Ensuring Continued
Access to Credit for Low-Income Americans (July 31, 2003),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/newsrelease.asp?Doc=9YWB2OJB.xml (last visited Feb. 7,
2004).
149. See Lipsett, supra note 3, at 552.
150. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904 (proposed Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
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C. The Effects of Preemption on Predatory Lending In North
Carolina
Assuming preemption occurs in North Carolina, consumers
will lose many of the state protections."' The field preemption
proposal would effectively preempt all state laws applying to
national banks. 5 2  The OCC has proposed a rule that would
replace extensive state statutes with a single restriction on lenders:
banks must make loans based on the borrower's ability to pay, not
the foreclosure value of collateral.'53 John Hawke has stated that
this rule "addresses one of the defining characteristics of predatory
lending-the extension of credit with the intent of seizing a
borrower's home or other collateral."' 54 While the North Carolina
predatory lending law and other state efforts have attacked loans
with questionable terms, the OCC hopes to attack lenders with
questionable practices.'55 According to the Comptroller of the
Currency, the OCC has found "a better way to combat abusive
lending practices" than the current state regulatory schemes.'56
The National Association of Attorneys General, however, believe
that the OCC's preemptive strike will hurt consumers who are
vulnerable to predatory lending.'57
In addition, the North Carolina predatory lending law lacks
a preemption parity provision like Georgia.'58  The lending
restrictions would still apply to state banks and nonbank lenders
unless the state legislature repealed the predatory lending act.
151. Letter from Neil Milner, supra note 118.
152. Id.
153. Cantor, supra note 77.
154. See Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 148.
155. Todd Davenport, OCC Chief Seen Leaning on Preemption of Ga. Law, AM.
BANKER, April 17, 2003, at 6, available at 2003 WL 3345337.
156. Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 148.
157. See Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency 17 (Oct. 6, 2003) www.naag.org/
issues/pdf/20031006-multi-occ.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). The National
Association of Attorneys General believes that federal protections in the area of
predatory lending are inadequate. Id.
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24 (2003).
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Thus, state banks would be at a competitive disadvantage with
their national counterparts.
159
V. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PREEMPTION ON
PREDATORY LENDING
A. The Enforceability of Predatory Lending Laws
State law supporters contend that state regulators should
possess a greater ability to prevent, detect, and prosecute
predatory lenders.' 60  Roy Cooper maintains that regulators in
Washington, D.C. are not able to combat predatory lending in
North Carolina as effectively as regulators in North Carolina.'61 In
defense of the North Carolina predatory lending law, Cooper has
said that "if the feds take away our authority on the issue, it could
lead to predatory lending falling right back to where it was." 162
The OCC discards this argument based on its belief that the
evidence that national banks are involved in predatory lending is
"virtually non-existent."' 163  The OCC points to a brief filed by
nearly two dozen state Attorneys General who now oppose
preemption.' 64 In the brief, the Attorneys General argue the
position that: "[b]ased on consumer complaints received, as well as
investigations and enforcement actions undertaken by the
Attorneys General, predatory lending abuses are largely confined
to the subprime mortgage lending market .... ,,16S These subprime
lenders are usually mortgage and finance companies who would
not be affected by preemption by the OCC.166
159. See LISA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICES 181-83 (1st ed. 2001).
160. See Eisley & Serres, supra note 55, at 1A.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding
National City Preemption Determination and Order (July 31, 2003),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/statementhawke.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
164. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption
Determination and Order Concerning the Georgia Fair Lending Act, Questions and
Answers (July 31, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/docs/03/
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B. The Uniformity of a National Standard
State law supporters question why the OCC would not
allow national banks to be subject to state predatory lending laws
if no national bank engages in predatory lending. 67 John Hawke
believes that differing state laws "introduce new standards for
subprime lending that are untested, sometimes vague, often
complex, and in many cases, different from established and well-
understood federal requirements."'' 68 The uniform standard that
would result from the enactment of the OCC's anti-predator rule
will protect national banks from having to operate under different
laws in every state.169 Wachovia Corporation, already challenging
a Connecticut mortgage company licensing statute on preemption
grounds, has joined with other national banks in "support[ing]
national standards that address unfair lending practices. ,,70
According to the OCC, the differing standards in each state place
a burden on interstate banks because liability could arise from any
misstep.71
C. The Stringency of the Predatory Lending Law Provisions
Consumer activists agree that states should continue to
regulate predatory lending because federal efforts are
inadequate.'72 Under the current federal scheme, most statutory
efforts are concerned with ensuring fair disclosure and
nondiscrimination, not preventing the actual predatory practices. 1
73
In response to the OCC's action, William Brennan, director of the
Home Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, said
that "[the OCC] sent a message that predatory lending is fine for
Georgia." '74 In similarity with the GFLA, the North Carolina law
167. Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., supra note
163.
168. Cantor, supra note 77.
169. See id.
170. Jody Shenn, Federal Banks Still Want National Predator Law, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 61298320.
171. Questions and Answers, supra note 164.
172. See Davenport & Cantor, supra note 73.
173. See Daugherty, supra note 11, at 576-77.
174. Luke, supra note 80, at G1.
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has strict provisions that prohibit predatory practices that the
federal law does not.175 Again, the OCC responds that more
stringent provisions are not needed because national banks are not
engaged in predatory lending.'76
D. The Availability of Credit under Predatory Lending Laws
The OCC believes that the problem with state predatory
lending laws is that varying standards and strict provisions lead to
less credit.'77 John Hawke has concluded that state predatory
lending laws "obstruct or, for practical purposes ... prevent
national banks and their subsidiaries from making certain types of
real estate loans, which causes an overall reduction in
credit. ... ,'17 The OCC argues that high interest rates, balloon
payments, and fees are not necessarily abusive lending practices.'79
Higher effective interest rates on these loans are simply a result of
the higher risks associated with subprime lending. 8 ° Additionally,
according to the OCC, there are three reasons why predatory
lending laws may impede the flow of legitimate credit to
homebuyers if lenders cannot charge higher rates and fees: (1)
lenders may be reluctant to extend credit in jurisdictions with
these laws because of the increased legal risks, (2) lenders may be
unable to sell loans originated in that jurisdiction, and (3) lenders
face the increased costs of complying with the law in these
jurisdictions.' 8' The OCC favors a policy of protecting access to
credit while preventing predatory lending, rather than prohibiting
national banks from making loans on favorable terms to risky
borrowers.'82
175. Eisley & Serres, supra note 55.
176. See Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., supra
note 163.
177. See id.
178. Cantor, supra note 77.
179. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory
Lending, OCC Working Paper (July 30, 2003) at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
industry/docs/03/occ-workpaper0730.pdf [hereinafter Working Paper].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., supra note
163.
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As evidence of the reduced availability of credit, the OCC
cites a study conducted for them by Gregory Elliehausen and
Michael Staten.'83 Their study found that lending to subprime
borrowers in North Carolina declined significantly since the
passage of the North Carolina predatory lending law.'84 The
overall number of subprime mortgage originations declined by
about fourteen percent. 85 During the same time period, according
to Elliehausen and Staten, out-of-state subprime borrowers
secured the same number of loan originations.'86
North Carolina state law supporters, however, point to a
contradictory study conducted by the Center for Community
Capitalism at The University of North Carolina. 87 According to
this study, the overall decline in subprime originations can be
attributed to refinance originations, not loans for purchase. 88
Since the majority of predatory loans are refinances, this should be
expected. 8 9  Dr. Stegman, Director of UNC's Center for
Community Capitalism said "the study shows that since the North
Carolina law went into full effect the subprime market has
behaved just as the law intended. The number of loans with
predatory characteristics has fallen without ... restricting access to
loans to borrowers with blemished credit... ,,190
The UNC Center for Community Capitalism believes that
it revealed different findings from the Elliehausen Study because it
focused on specific market segments with and without predatory
features rather than the overall subprime market. 9' By analyzing
183. Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Regulation of Subprime Morgtgage
Products: An analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, Credit Research
Center Working Paper No. 66 (November 2002) (on file with NCBI).
184. Working Paper, supra note 179.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Press Release, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School, Study: NC Predatory
Lending Law Cuts Abuses, Does Not Dry Up Credit for Borrowers (June 25, 2003),
http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/News/DetailsNewsPage.cfm?id=466 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Kenan-Flagler Release].
188. Quercia, et. al., The Impact of North Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Law:
A Descriptive Assessment, Center for Community Capitalism at the Frank Hawkins
Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise (2003).
189. Id.
190. Kenan-Flagler Release, supra note 187.
191. Quercia, et. al., supra note 188.
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the law from this perspective, the study was able to show a
decrease in refinancing fees, balloon payments, and negative
amortization, but not in purchase originations.9 2  The OCC,
however, attributes the different findings to the UNC study's
definition of a subprime borrower as one with a FICO score, a
measure of a person's creditworthiness, of less than 580.'9' The
largest sector of subprime borrowers, however, have a FICO score
of 580-660.194 Therefore, the OCC argues the UNC study presents
an incomplete picture of the subprime market. 95
VI. CONCLUSION
The preemption of North Carolina predatory lending law
appears to be a foregone conclusion. 196 The new federal regulation
would insure a uniform standard that will hopefully enable lenders
to provide more credit to subprime borrowers. 97 In accomplishing
this goal, however, the OCC has sacrificed stringent prohibitions
and enforcement abilities.'98 Therefore, the OCC's policy should
provide more credit to subprime borrowers, but it will allow this
credit to be extended at more oppressive terms. 99 North Carolina
home purchasers may need to be better informed in order to
secure fair credit without the state protections. Instead, the OCC
has provided them with a greater opportunity to own their own
home.
C. BAILEY KING, JR.
192. Id.
193. Working Paper, supra note 179.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 131-146 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 167-195 and accompanying text.
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